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Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, phi-
losophers have struggled with the question of how thought experiments 
manage to provide knowledge. Ernst Mach’s seminal contribution has 
eclipsed other approaches in the Austrian tradition. I discuss one of 
these neglected approaches. Faced with the challenge of how to recon-
cile his empiricist position with his use of thought experiments, Moritz 
Schlick proposed the following ‘Sinnkriterium’: a thought experiment is 
meaningful if it allows to answer a question under discussion by imag-
ining the experiences that would confi rm that the thought experimental 
scenario is actual. I trace this view throughout three exemplary thought 
experiments of Schlick’s.
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Thought experiments are many and varied in science and philosophy. 
However, it is not so well understood how they contribute to our knowl-
edge of the world. Unlike real experiments, they do not seem to interact 
with the world in a way that would allow us to gather new information. 
This concern is aggravated if one subscribes to a broadly empiricist 
view. According to such a view, any knowledge is eventually due to 
our more or less direct experiential contact with reality. Hence it is 
especially interesting to see how philosophers with a strong empiricist 
creed react to the practice of thought experimenting. In this article, 
I shall discuss one classical position within the movement of logical 
positivism which has hitherto been eclipsed by the contributions of con-
temporaries like Ernst Mach: Moritz Schlick’s proposal of how to make 
sense of thought experiments.
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1. What is a Thought Experiment?
I shall start with a fi rst take on thought experiments. The notion was 
coined in German by the physicist Hans-Christian Ørsted (1822), who 
used the word ‘Gedankenexperiment’ to refer to Kant’s account of ge-
ometry in terms of the a priori use of imagination. Philosophers like 
Ernst Mach (1897) greatly expanded the scope of the term, including 
the scientifi c standard cases which also stand out in current debate, 
Galilei’s falling bodies experiment, Newton’s bucket experiment, and 
so on. Mach also gave a fi rst empiricist account of how thought experi-
ments can provide new knowledge. It makes tacit constraints imposed 
on imagination in the course of human evolution explicit. The role of 
retrieving and rearranging tacit knowledge plays a role in many recent 
accounts of thought experiments (e.g. Miscevic 1992).
Thought experiments do not only pervade science, they also abound 
in philosophy. I shall attempt at outlining some structural features of 
a typical philosophical thought experiment.
1) Ther e is a question under discussion QUD.
2) An (as if) individual situation is described.
3) The situation is invented: we do not care whether it is actual.
4) Intuition: what would be the case in the situation?
5) The intuition is instrumental in answering the QUD.
Of course, this structure is only minimal. The aim is not to give nec-
essary and suffi cient conditions of thought experiments, but only to 
provide a fi rst idea. I shall illustrate the structure by an example from 
the philosophical debate, so-called Gettier cases. I choose this example 
because it is one of the few successful thought experiments in philoso-
phy, and it is used in many metaphilosophical debates (e.g. Williamson 
2007). 
1.  Q UD: Is knowledge justifi ed true belief (JTB)?
2.–3. Invented scenario:
GC: At 8:28, Smith looks at a clock to see what time it is. The 
clock is broken; it stopped exactly twenty-four hours previously. 
Smith believes, on the basis of the clock’s reading, that it is 8:28.(cf. 
Williamson 2009)
4. Intuition: GC is possible.
If GC were actual, would Smith have JTB?—Yes!
If GC were actual, would Smith have knowledge?—No!
5. Hence knowledge is not (just) JTB.
This is only a schematic presentation of main structural features. If we 
look for a sound logical argument, the following formalization is plau-
sible (Williamson 2007: 195):
(i) Necessarily, for any subject S and proposition p, S knows p if 
and only if S has justifi ed true belief in p.
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(ii) Possibly, some S is in GC.
(iii) If some S were in GC, some S would have justifi ed true belief in 
some p without knowing p.
(iv) It is possible that some S has justifi ed true belief in some p with-
out knowing p.
Thus: not (i)
Having outlined a preliminary idea of thought experiments, I shall 
address what might be their most puzzling feature. In ‘normal’ experi-
ments, we settle a question about independent reality by observation. 
Experiments are more sophisticated versions of observational practice. 
One arranges for standard observational conditions which are ideal 
for answering a question, and then one observes what happens under 
these conditions. For instance, in order to test whether there are Higgs 
bosons, physicists built a large hadron collider in which particles were 
accelerated until they had almost light speed. Under these conditions, 
Higgs bosons could be observed. 
In thought experiments, one main ingredient of normal experi-
ments is lacking. We do not observe an independent reality. One may 
try to frame thought experiments as observations of one’s own reac-
tions to certain considerations, but in my view this would be mislead-
ing. Thought experiments simply do not aim at observation in the way 
normal experiments do. The question becomes how merely imagined 
scenarios can be informative. Relatedly, when does it make sense to 
answer a question by using such a scenario?
Although there is a huge literature on thought experiments, these 
questions have not yet found a wholly satisfactory answer. Instead of 
trying to present one of my own, I shall consider an answer dating back 
to the fi rst half of the 20th century. I fi nd this answer interesting not 
only because it has been somewhat neglected in the literature but also 
because of the peculiar dialectical situation. While the point of thought 
experiments is diffi cult to appreciate in principle, the diffi culty is much 
aggravated in a strongly empiricist framework. The answer I shall con-
sider is bound to such a framework.
2. Schlick’s ‘Sinnkriterium’ for Thought Experiments
Moritz Schlick is famous for being the founder of one of the most in-
fl uential groups of philosophers to have fl ourished in the 20th century, 
the Vienna Circle. Schlick was also one of the main authors to set the 
circle’s agenda. Among his tenets ranks the famous ‘Sinnprinzip’: the 
meaning of a statement consists in the conditions of its empirical ver-
ifi cation. He also endorsed his own version of logical positivism, the 
view that any meaningful question has to be settled either by analysing 
one’s use of language or by empirical means. Given these key convic-
tions, it comes barely as a surprise that Schlick seems highly critical of 
thought experiments as far as they  draw on merely invented scenarios:
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…the philosopher is barely interested in merely fancied, invented objects; 
it is the real world that poses the big problems for him. ([1929] GAI/6: 162; 
all translations are mine)
The context of this passage from Schlick’s 1929 article Erkenntnistheo-
rie und moderne Physik (Erkenntnistheorie and modern physics) is the 
following: Schlick contends that the task of epistemology is complete if 
it can account for scientifi c knowledge of reality. There is no need for it 
to consider objects which are not actual. Now this seems precisely what 
thought experiments like Gettier’s do: they make us consider invented 
situations which are not actual. Thus, Schlick seems to say that phi-
losophers should not bother about thought experiments.
However, there are also remarks which point in the opposite direc-
tion, in particular the one originally in French from which I took the 
title of this article:
The representation of worlds departing from the real one requires a seri-
ous effort of imagination… But is fancy a privilege of poets? Don‘t we have 
a right to suppose it in philosophers? ([1935] GA I/6: 607)
Here Schlick seems to say that philosophers can be expected to use 
their imagination just as poets to represent worlds which are different 
from the real one. The context of this passage, the thought experiment 
to be considered in section 3.2. below, makes clear that Schlick does 
not oppose but endorses certain efforts of philosophers to come up with 
fi ctive scenarios which diverge from reality. The question becomes how 
to reconcile these two remarks.
There is one obvious way of reconciling the two quotes. The reconcil-
iatory proposal is that philosophers may consider non-actual scenarios 
as long as considering them contributes to answering questions about 
reality, the ones philosophers are interested in. Howe ver, this require-
ment leads to new concerns: given Schlick’s empiricist creed, we access 
reality by experience. We make observations and theorize about them. 
This is how we answer questions about reality. How could fi ctive sce-
narios contribute to such an access? 
In order to solve this problem, I shall take inspiration from a key 
verifi cationist tenet of Schlick. Thought experiments should contribute 
to answering questions about reality. Schlick imposes a verifi cationist 
constraint on meaningful questions:
A question is in principle answerable (I should like to say: it is a „good ques-
tion“) if we can imagine the experiences which we would have to have in 
order to give the answer. ([1932] GA I/6: 404)
A question has to be answerable, perhaps not here and now, but in 
principle. Otherwise it would miss its point as a question. A suffi cient 
(and presumably necessary) condition for a question to be answerable 
is that we can anticipate the experiences which would allow to answer 
it in imagination.
In assigning the role of anticipating experience to imagination, 
Schlick seems to subscribe to a simulationalist view of imagination. 
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Here is a classical statement of this view:
Imaginative projection involves the capacity to have, and in good measure 
to control the having of, states that are not perceptions or beliefs 
or decisions or experiences of movemen ts of one’s body but which are in 
various ways like those states—like them in ways that enable the states 
possessed through imagination to mimic and, relative to certain purposes 
to substitute for perceptions, beliefs, decisions, and experiences of move-
ments. (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 11)
In this quote, Currie and Ravenscroft present the imagination as a ca-
pacity of recreating or simulating mental states, among them percep-
tual states as we enjoy them in experience. Schlick assigns a key role 
to such a recreative imagination. The ability of using imagination is a 
prerequisite of our ability to ask and answer questions and thus of any 
intellectual activity. In order to grasp a question, we must be able to 
use imagination in anticipating the possible experiences which would 
serve to answer the question.
The notion of imagination needs to be clarifi ed, though. Many phi-
losophers bind imagination to a capacity to conjure up qualitative 
states like visual imagery as contrasted to states with purely non-qual-
itative content like propositions, concepts, and the like (cf. Kind 2001). 
Schlick seems to agree. This leads him to a qualifi cation of his condition 
for meaningful questions:
I do not think, for instance, that we can be charged with talking 
nonsense if we speak of a universe of ten dimensions, or of beings 
possessing sense organs and having perceptions entirely different from 
ours; and yet it does not seem right to say that we are able to imagine 
such beings and such perceptions, or a ten-dimensional world. But we must 
be able to say under what observable circumstances we should assert 
the existence of the beings or sense-organs just referred to. ([1936] GA 
I/6: 730)
In this quote, Schlick seems to acknowledge that we can ask meaningful 
questions about a universe of ten dimensions or beings with completely 
different sensory experiences than ours. Such topics go far beyond our 
reality. Our reality might eventually turn out to be one with ten dimen-
sions or beings with completely different sensory experiences, but we 
cannot simply presuppose that it will. Judging from Schlick’s criterion 
for good questions, we should be able to imagine experiences which 
would make us answer the question whether such scenarios are real in 
the affi rmative. However, we cannot imagine ten dimensions or what 
it would be like to have completely different sense perceptions, says 
Schlick. The reason, I surmise, is that imagination is bound to quali-
tative states we are in a position to recreate. We cannot qualitatively 
represent ten dimensions or sense experiences which are completely 
different from ours.
One may wonder why Schlick emphasizes these limits of imagina-
tion. One answer is that he considers the claim that we would have to 
imagine a universe with ten dimensions or beings with different sense 
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organs in order to imaginatively anticipate the experiences we would 
have to make to posit the existence of such items. This claim seems 
doubtful. After all, we might posit these objects by broadly abductive 
reasoning, i.e. as theoretical entities which explain experiences with 
quite a different qualitative content. Anything else would amount to an 
implausibly radical empiricism, according to which theoretical concepts 
somehow have to be built from qualitative experiences. Although there 
are some indications that Schlick at a certain point in his career fl irted 
with such a radically empiricist view of conceptual content (Oberdan 
1996: Sec. 2), I shall not further discuss this aspect of Schlick’s work. 
Suffi ce it to say that, judging from the above quote, Schlick does not 
hold that we would have to imagine objects like a ten-dimensional uni-
verse or alien perceptions directly.
In order to make room for meaningful questions about a universe 
with ten dimensions etc., we do not have to imagine a universe with 
ten dimensions or what creatures with alien sense organs experience 
directly but only which experiences of ours would lead to positing such 
items by way of theorizing on our experiences, for instance by inference 
to the best explanation. For instance, the best explanation of our actual 
observations of the physical realm may be to posit ten dimensions, even 
if we can only perceive three of them. And the best way of accounting 
for the function of dog whistles may be to claim that dogs can hear 
sounds in the ultrasonic range, even if we cannot imagine hearing such 
sounds. Taking into account such indirect ways of imagining the perti-
nent experiences, we can uphold a defi nition of meaningful questions 
in terms of imagination.
In how far do these fi ndings on meaningful questions bear on dis-
cerning useful thought experiments? I venture a constructive proposal: 
a thought experiment is useful precisely if it contributes to answering 
a meaningful question about reality. For a question to be meaningful, 
we have to imagine the experiences which would allow us to answer it. 
I suggest that there is an analogous condition for thought experiments:
Sinnkriterium: a thought experiment is meaningful only if we can 
imagine the experiences which would confi rm to us that the experi-
mental scenario is real.
This is a constructive proposal. In order for us to use a thought ex-
periment, it must contribute to answering a meaningful question about 
reality. A question is meaningful precisely if we can imagine the ex-
periences that would lead to answering it. It does not follow that we 
have to consider the experiences which would confi rm that the thought 
experimental scenario is real. Alternatively, one may think of a more 
indirect relationship between experience and the scenario, in particu-
lar that experience only confi rms the scenario to be possible in some 
sense. This alternative seems even more plausible, or at least better 
in tune with our current ways of thinking about thought experiments. 
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However, Schlick’s practice of thought experimenting supports that he 
indeed had something like my constructive proposal in mind. One may 
feel uncertain about my broad use of ‘meaningful’. Shouldn’t the notion 
be restricted to linguistic meaning? I suggest that we think of thought 
experimental descriptions which have a linguistic meaning and thus 
can be assessed as to whether they are meaningful.
I shall now present three thought experiments discussed by Schlick 
in which I see the sinnkriterium at work. In order to perform a good 
thought experiment, we have to imagine the experiences which would 
confi rm that the experimental scenario is real. Moreover, this imagina-
tion should bear on answering the question about reality which the 
thought experimenter set out to answer.
3. Three Exemplary Applications
3.1. Poincaré’s Thought Experiment
My fi rst example is a thought experiment which Schlick adapts from 
the physicist Henri Poincaré. The question to be answered is whether 
physical magnitudes are absolute or only relative to other magnitudes, 
in particular whether there is absolute space as Newton had it. To an-
swer this question, Poincaré invites us to imagine all spatial structures 
to suddenly grow by the same proportion:
Imagine that all bodies in the world over night grow to huge size, their di-
mension is enlarged by the factor 100… I am a Goliath of 180m and use a 
15m fountain pen to draw letters on the paper which are several me-
ters high, and in an analogous fashion all other magnitudes in the 
universe have changed, such that the new world, though enlarged, 
geometrically resembles the old one. ([1917] GA I/2: 198–199)
Schlick devotes a lengthy discussion to the precise general formulation 
of this thought experiment. As it stands, it does not answer Poincaré’s 
question. It leaves open key issues like whether the masses of objects 
also change. Schlick eventually settles for a formulation in terms of a 
suitable mapping of spacetime points which is in tune which his phi-
losophy of physics. These subtleties do not matter for my general topic. 
I shall consider the case as originally described under the simplify-
ing assumption of a static universe which only undergoes the sudden 
transformation described by Poincaré. Moreover, all our measuring de-
vices are assumed to be geometrical ones.
According to the sinnkriterium, in order to deal with this thought 
experiment, we have to imagine the experience which would confi rm 
the scenario to be real, Schlick notes:
What would I feel like after such a change? I wouldn‘t notice the change. 
Since all objects have participated in the enlargement, all objects and in-
struments, we would lack any means to fi gure out the imagined change. 
([1917] GA I/2: 199)
There can be no experience which would confi rm that we are in Poin-
caré’s scenario, says Schlick, adding:
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This whole change exists only for those who mistakenly argue as if 
space were absolute… Hence  the enlarged universe is not only indistin-
guishable from the original one, it simply is the same universe, there is no 
sense in talking of a difference as the absolute size of a body is nothing ‘real’. 
([1917] GA I/2: 199)
Schlick’s remarks show that we need to be careful in applying the 
sinnkriterium. Originally, one would have thought that a meaningful 
thought experiment requires to imagine the experiences which confi rm 
that the scenario is real. In contrast, Poincaré’s thought experiment 
seems to work precisely by our inability of imagine such experiences. 
How could that be?
Here is my proposal how to construe the dialectics of Poincaré’s 
thought experiment. Poincaré describes a scenario which his opponent 
who believes in absolute space is committed to accept as a meaningful 
thought experiment: all spatial magnitudes might change proportion-
ally although we would be unable to detect that they do. It is not Poin-
caré but his opponent who must be prepared to perform this thought 
experiment. Applying the sinnkriterium, we notice that the scenario is 
not meaningful. For we cannot imagine the experiences which would 
confi rm that the scenario is real. This shows that the idea of abso-
lute space leads to absurd consequences: one must accept a scenario 
as meaningful which does not make sense. Poincaré’s opponent would 
have to answer which experiences would confi rm that the scenario is 
real, but there is no positive answer to this question.
I note that there is also a weaker interpretation of the dialectics. 
Sometimes it seems as if Schlick had only in mind that unobservable 
change is nothing that makes sense to a physicist, who underlies stron-
ger obligations of supporting her claims by observation. I grant that 
Schlick at this point may not yet invoke a general sinnkriterium. But 
if we consider how to embed his take on Poincarés experiment into 
his overall philosophical position, the more ambitious interpretation 
seems plausible.
3.2. Private Psychological States
My second example can be dubbed the thought experiment of private 
psychological states. Schlick envisions a scenario in which mental 
states are completely isolated from physical ones. The initial question 
which motivates this thought experiment is the following: can state-
ments on mental states be reduced to statements about physical 
states? The question is motivated. Many pundits nowadays say things 
like ‘the brain feels, thinks…’. If we reason this claim through, we may 
end with the claim that my state of, say, being in pain, is identical or 
reduces to a certain physical state of my brain. A related claim is that a 
sentence like ‘some being is in pain’ is a sentence about a certain iden-
tifi able physical state. Against this claim, Schlick develops his thought 
experiment. He imagines a scenario in which there are beings with quali-
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tative mental states. They experience what it is like to be in such a state. 
But there is no correlation between these qualitative states and anything 
physical. To Schlick, true sentences about the qualitative states of these 
beings are not sentences about anything physical. This shows that state-
ments about mental states do not in principle reduce to statements about 
physical facts.
My interest is not so much the success or failure of this thought ex-
periment, but how the experiment is presented by Schlick. In Schlick’s de-
scription of the experiment, we can see the sinnkriterium at work. Schlick 
says about his scenario:
We should perhaps talk of two realms, one physical, public, common, 
the other private, psychological, consisting entirely of monologues… the 
two worlds would be parallel but they remain connected. ([1935] GA I/6: 
607, m.e.)
The fi nal sentence is puzzling. Why do the two worlds, the physical 
and the psychological one, have to be connected? In what way are they 
connected? And how does this connection square with Schlick’s stipula-
tion that there is no correlation between private mental and physical 
states?
In my view, the answer again lies in the sinnkriterium. In order to 
perform the experiment, we have to ask which experiences would con-
fi rm that there are the two separate realms, the physical and the psy-
chological one. Experience would have to confi rm to one and the same 
cognizer both that there is the physical realm and the isolated psycho-
logical realm. This can only be done if the cognizer herself has access 
both to the physical and the psychological realm. The cognizer must on 
the one hand have suitable experiences of the physical world. These 
experiences must be systematically correlated with physical facts. On 
the other hand, she must also have a range of experiences which so 
completely lack any systematic correlation with physical states that 
she cannot even communicate them to others.
To illustrate the point, assume that there is a community of re-
searchers who lack eyesight. However, only one of them, Mary, addi-
tionally has intense psychedelic colour experiences which occur ran-
domly. Since the others do not have colour experiences and there are 
no physical correlates to Mary’s experiences, there is no way she could 
communicate to the others what she is experiencing. At best the others 
could notice (if they take her avowals seriously) that she has a random 
pattern of experiences which they have no further access to.
One may question the experiment by doubting that one can have a 
private language to be used for monologues about private experiences. 
More importantly, one may ask what modal status we have to assign to 
the scenario for it to say something about psychological sentences in our 
language. Perhaps all true psychological statements in our language 
are perfectly correlated with physical statements. As a consequence, 
one may wonder why the theoretical alternative of psychological state-
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ments which are not correlated in this way with physical statements 
matters if our main interest is to settle questions about reality. But it 
is not my purpose here to assess the success or failure of the thought 
experiment. My interest is only to show how Schlick’s metatheory of 
thought experiments drives his interpretation of his own experiment. 
The combination of access to the physical and the private realm in one 
and the same cognizer is a direct result of the sinnkriterium.
3.3. Immortality
My third example is interesting especially due to its aftermath in the 
history of 20th century philosophy. It illustrates Schlick’s empiricist 
take on the age-old question of human immortality. To appreciate the 
standing of the question: when we nowadays read Descartes’s Medita-
tions, we are primarily interested in his Cogito ergo sum, his radical 
doubt, his mind-body dualism. But Descartes himself titled the Medita-
tions ‘Meditations on the fi rst philosophy, in which the existence of God 
and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated’ (Descartes 1641). The 
question of immortality seems to have been a primary preoccupation of 
Descartes. Moreover, he approached the question by purely intellectual 
inquiry, detached from all sense experience.
As an empiricist, Schlick must take a completely different approach. 
He addresses the question by asking what experience might contribute to 
answering it. To Schlick, the main contribution would concern empirical 
evidence that one has survived one’s own bodily death. Here is what this 
evidence might be like:
In fact I can easily imagine, e.g., witnessing the funeral of my own body 
and continuing to exist without a body, for nothing is easier than to describe 
a world which differs from our ordinary world only in the complete absence 
of all data which I would call parts of my own body. ([1936] GA I/6: 731–733)
Again Schlick develops a thought experimental scenario, one’s survival 
of one’s own death, by asking which experiences might confi rm that this 
scenario is real. He envisions the experience of attending his own funer-
al without having any experiences confi rming that he has a body. It is 
an interesting question how Schlick could imagine watching his funeral 
without thereby having data about his having an embodied perceptual 
system standing in physical contact with his physical surroundings. It 
also sounds strange to talk of parts of the body as data. A realist may 
insist that parts of the body are not simply bits of information, they are 
material beings out there. But again, my purpose is not to discuss the 
minutes of Schlick’s experiment. Instead I note that, to Schlick, the sce-
nario of surviving one’s own death makes sense only if we can imagine 
the experiences which would confi rm that the scenario is real.
Schlick’s empirical twist of the issue of immortality has sparked 
criticism by Bernard Williams. Williams says:
Schlick f amously claimed that survival after death must be a con-
tingent matter, because he could imagine watching his own funeral. In 
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order to make good this claim, Schlick would have had to give a coher-
ent account of how, as participant at his own funeral, he could be himself, 
Schlick; all the problems of continuity, personal identity, and so forth are 
called up. (Williams 1973: 40)1
Williams notes that Schlick took survival of one’s own death to be a 
contingent matter, as contrasted, for instance, to Descartes, who con-
sidered it a consequence of the necessary metaphysical structure of the 
world, not to be ascertained by observation but by purely intellectual in-
quiry.2 I do not think that Schlick aimed at establishing the contingency 
of survival after death, though. Rather he wanted to bring out the only 
way to make sense of the very question of immortality: by telling how 
we could fi nd out whether we are immortal by empirical means.
Williams’s second criticism is more interesting: Schlick might have 
devised a scenario of a subject watching Schlick’s funeral, but what 
could confi rm to the subject that it is the same person, Schlick, who 
is being buried and watching his funeral? I think that this criticism, 
whatever its ultimate plausibility, is telling. It shows the limitations 
imposed on thought experiments by Schlick’s sinnkriterium. Either the 
question whether it is he himself, Schlick, who observes his funeral, 
is a meaningful question. Then the question must be principally an-
swerable by experience, for instance by the experienced continuity of 
psychological states. Or the question does not make sense because it 
cannot be answered empirically. In this case, Williams criticism might 
still apply. It might just show that Schlick’s thought experiment did 
not live up to his own standards. He would not have devised conditions 
that could empirically confi rm his surviving his own bodily death. And 
this failure might indicate that the whole question of immortality be-
comes meaningless by Schlick’s standards.
4. In Conclusion
I have illustrated Schlick’s sinnkriterium for thought experiment by 
several applications. But what are we to make of this account? Is it just 
a curious footnote in the history of logical positivism? I shall close with 
two remarks.
On the one hand, Schlick’s criterium surely imposes strong limi-
tations on thought experiments. Nowadays these precise limitations 
do not seem overwhelmingly plausible. For instance, we presumably 
can conceive a universe which exists although there is no way of as-
certaining its existence by observation, for instance our universe as 
it would have been if there had been no intelligent life. This thought 
experiment tells us something about our reality, as witnessed by the 
1 Thanks to Bernhard Thöle for bringing this passage from Williams to my 
attention.
2 More precisely, Descartes thought that the soul is necessarily immortal as far 
as its continuous existence only depends on God’s continuous support and not on 
anything physical.
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discussion of the so-called anthropic principle among scientists. The 
argument from the anthropic principle roughly goes as follows: there is 
nothing remarkable about the universe giving rise to conscious life. If 
it were different, we would simply be unable to observe it. The opposite 
impression is just due to selection bias. The thought experiment makes 
sense. But if we apply Schlick’s sinnkriterium, we would have to ask 
which observations could confi rm the existence of a universe devoid of 
intelligent life, and, of course, there can be no such observations.
Moreover, there are doubts that Schlick’s sinnkriterium elucidates 
our standard way of tackling thought experiments. For instance, surely 
we can answer which experiences would confi rm us that a Gettier case 
is real. As for GC, we have to observe a person looking at a clock, ob-
servation must confi rm us that the clock stopped precisely 24h earlier, 
and so on. But this answer is trite. It does not really capture anything 
that matters in dealing with this thought experiment. In particular, 
Schlick offers nothing like the sophisticated apparatus of alethic mo-
dalities which structures the current debate of thought experiments. 
This leaves us somewhat clueless about how merely imagining experi-
ence which might be arbitrarily unlikely to become real could tell us 
anything about our reality. The problem already surfaced at the end of 
section (3.2.). Schlick does not offer an answer to the crucial question 
how mere imagination can generate new information as Mach did in 
his proposal that tacit empirical constraints are written into our minds 
by evolution.
On the other hand, in recent times, empiricist tendencies in modal 
epistemology are on the rise (e.g. Bueno and Shalkowski 2015, Mar-
tínez 2015, Fischer and Leon 2017). Philosophers have become suspi-
cious of lofty possibility claims which are not somehow grounded by 
empirical science. The same goes for thought experiments. Notwith-
standing huge differences in detail, empirically-minded philosophers 
may be inspired by Schlick’s thoroughly empiricist attitude, which also 
becomes manifest in his account of thought experiments.
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